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 energy exchange


A Scalable Interdependent Multi-Issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange

Alam, Muddasser (University of Southampton) | Gerding, Enrico H. (University of Southampton) | Rogers, Alex (University of Southampton) | Ramchurn, Sarvapali D. (University of Southampton)

AAAI Conferences

To address We present a novel negotiation protocol to facilitate this challenge, Alam et al. [2013b] presented a protocol to energy exchange between off-grid homes that facilitate negotiation over energy exchange. Their protocol are equipped with renewable energy generation and restricts the type and number of offers such that negotiation electricity storage. Our protocol imposes restrictions leads to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). However, over negotiation such that it reduces the complex their protocol only allows point-to-point communication interdependent multi-issue negotiation to one and relies on a fully connected network topology (i.e., where agents have a strategy profile in subgame each home is connected to all other homes in the community) perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that our protocol whereby the number of connections and messages exchanged; is concurrent, scalable and; under certain conditions; grow quadratically with the number of connected leads to Pareto-optimal outcomes.


Interdependent Multi-Issue Negotiation for Energy Exchange in Remote Communities

Alam, Muddasser (University of Southampton) | Rogers, Alex ( University of Southampton ) | Ramchurn, Sarvapali D (University of Southampton)

AAAI Conferences

We present a novel negotiation protocol to facilitate energy exchange between off-grid homes that are equipped with renewable energy generation and electricity storage. Our protocol imposes restrictions over negotiation such that it reduces the complex interdependent multi-issue negotiation to one where agents have a strategy profile in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that our negotiation protocol is tractable, concurrent, scalable and leads to Pareto-optimal outcomes in a decentralised manner. We empirically evaluate our protocol and show that, in this instance, a society of agents can (i) improve the overall utilities by 14% and (ii) reduce their overall use of the batteries by 37%.